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Abstract
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly used to provide infrastructure
services. Even though PPPs have the potential to increase efficiency and improve resource allocation, contract renegotiations have been pervasive.
We show that existing accounting standards allow governments to renegotiate PPP
contracts and elude spending limits. Our model of renegotiations leads to observable
predictions: (i) in a competitive market, firms lowball their offers, expecting to break
even through renegotiation, (ii) renegotiations compensate lowballing and pay for additional expenditure, (iii) governments use renegotiation to increase spending and shift
the burden of payments to future administrations, and (iv) there are significant renegotiations in the early stages of the contract, e.g. during construction. We use data on
Chilean renegotiations of PPP contracts to examine these predictions and find that the
evidence is consistent with the predictions of our model. Finally, we show that if PPP
investments are counted as current government spending, the incentives to renegotiate
contracts to increase spending disappear.
Keywords: Build-operate-and-transfer, concessions, lowballing.
JEL classification: H21, L51, L91.
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“Cynics suspect that the government
remains keen on PFI not because of
the efficiencies it allegedly offers but
because it allows ministers to perform
a useful accounting trick.”
The Economist, July 2nd 2009.

1 Introduction
Private participation in infrastructure provision has increased dramatically since the
early 1990s via public-private partnerships (PPPs).2,3 For example, the average annual
value of 22.9 billion Euros for PPP projects signed in Europe between 2002 and 2006 was
three times the annual average over the preceding decade.4 In the United States, where
until recently PPPs played a smaller role than in many European countries, financing of
transportation infrastructure via PPPs increased almost tenfold, on an annual basis, between 2006-2008 and the preceding decade (1996-2005).5 Similarly, investment in PPPs
in developing countries grew at an average annual rate of 28.3% between 1990 and 1997,
followed by a slowdown after the East-Asian crisis, and a new growth spurt beginning in
2003, reaching 114.3 billion dollars during 2006.6
One of the reasons for the popularity of PPPs is that governments can simultaneously
attract private firms and claim that they are not privatizing. Independently of these po2

A rich set of acronyms describe specific PPP arrangements, including BLT, BLTM, BOT, DBOT, DBFO,
DBFO/M, JV and ROT. The B usually stands for build, the L for lease, the R for rehabilitate, the T for transfer, the O for operate, the D for design, the F for finance, and the M for manage. JV stands for “joint
venture”. See Grimsey and Lewis (2005) and chapter 1 in Guasch (2004).
3
Infrastructure that has been provided via PPPs include roads, bridges, tunnels, railways, ports, airports, air traffic control systems, water and sanitation plants, hospitals, schools, prisons, and social housing.
4
Several European countries have well established PPP programs that account for 20% of public investment between 2001 and 2006, see Blanc-Brude et al. (2007). One of these programs is the United
Kingdom’s Private Finance Initiative (PFI) mentioned above in the quote from the Economist.
5
The projects (with financing in million dollars followed by the year of notice to proceed, in parenthesis) are the following: Pennsylvania Turnpike (12,300; 2008), Texas SH 130 (1,350; 2007), Indiana Toll Road
(3,850; 2006), Virginia’s Pocahontas Parkway (611; 2006), Chicago Skyway (1,830; 2005), California’s SR 125
(773; 2003), Jamaica-JFK Airtrain (930; 1999), New Jersey’s Trenton River Light Rail (604; 1999), Camino
Colombia Bypass in Texas (85; 1999), JFK Terminal 4 (689; 1997) and New Jersey’s Hudson-Bergen Light
Rail (1674; 1996). Source: Public Work Financing, October 2007.
6
Source: World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database. These amounts do not correspond to the exact concept of public-private partnerships, but constitute a reasonable (and the best available) proxy for
developing countries.
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litical reasons, PPPs have the potential to increase efficiency and improve resource allocation.7 Nevertheless, experience has revealed several pitfalls of PPPs.
One of the problems with PPPs is that renegotiations of contracts are pervasive. Guasch
(2004) examined nearly 1,000 Latin American concession contracts awarded between
the mid 1980s and 2000, and found that 30% of all contracts were renegotiated. The proportion reaches 54.4% in the transportation sector (roads, ports, tunnels and airports)
and 74.4% in the water sector.8 Guasch also finds that renegotiations often favor the
concessionaire. For example, in 62% of the cases they led to tariff increases, in 38% to
extensions of the concession term and in 62% to reductions in investment obligations.
Renegotiations are also pervasive in developed countries, see Gómez Ibáñez and Meyer
(1993).
What is the reason for frequent renegotiations? Industry participants claim that circumstances change over the life of a concession, which usually last many decades. According to this explanation, renegotiations are due to the long term, incomplete nature
of PPP contracts. However, this explanation ignores that renegotiations often occur during the construction phase, shortly after contracts are awarded. For example, Guasch
(2004, Table 6.4) reports an average of just 2.2 years between the concession award and
the first renegotiation.
In this paper we show that renegotiations of PPP contracts can be used by governments to circumvent budgetary constraints. In our model an incumbent that spends
more on infrastructure is more likely to be reelected. This creates a bias towards anticipating infrastructure spending relative to its welfare maximizing allocation over time.
We assume that under conventional provision, i.e., when the government hires a construction company to build infrastructure but controls the project thereafter, caps on
spending or on net fiscal debt are effective in controlling this bias. By contrast, we show
that because of defective fiscal accounting standards, renegotiations of PPP contracts
can be used to elude spending caps.
Essentially, because PPP arrangements bundle finance and construction, the firm
can “lend” to the government by renegotiating the contract in return for payments made
by future administrations. Under current fiscal accounting rules neither the additional
investments that take place after renegotiations, nor the future obligations assumed by
7

See, for example, Hart (2003), Bentz et al. (2005), Bennet and Iossa (2006), and Martimort and Pouyet
(2008).
8
It is worth noting that Guasch’s data base underestimates the prevalence of renegotiations due to censoring. For example, his data includes several Chilean concessions which at the time had not yet been
renegotiated, but which have been repeatedly renegotiated since 2000 (see section 3 below).
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the government in a renegotiation are accounted for in the budget. This suggests that
the solution to the spending bias is to ensure that PPP assets are counted as public investments at the moment they are built.
Our model has four observable implications: First, under competition for the contract, firms lowball their offers, expecting to get even in later renegotiations. Second,
additional works are included in the renegotiation of the contract. Third, major renegotiations occur shortly after the award of the contract. Fourth, an important fraction
of the costs of renegotiation are not borne by the current administration. We compile
information on the 50 concessions awarded in Chile between 1993 and 2006 and show
that it is consistent with these predictions.9 Total investment increased via renegotiation from $8.4 billion to $11.3 billion, i.e., by nearly one-third. Most of the increase (83%
of the total amount) was the result of 78 bilateral renegotiations, while the rest were decisions of arbitration panels.10 For the $2.3 billion awarded in bilateral renegotiations,
we find that only 35% of the additional cost was paid by the administration that renegotiated. Of that $2.3 billion, 84% corresponds to payments for additional works, while
the remaining 16% correspond to additional payments for works included in the original contract. Of the total, 78% was awarded during the construction phase. Finally, we
observe that even though specific provisions in the concessions law limit the amounts
that can be renegotiated, these limits are routinely exceeded.11
Our paper adds to the evidence on renegotiations and PPPs; see Guasch (2004);
Guasch and Straub (2006) and Guasch et al. (2006, 2007 and 2008). We also contribute to
the literature on soft budgets.12 In the standard mechanism, developed by Dewatripont
and Maskin (1995), the “center” lends and sinks money into a firm in period 1. Because
assets are sunk, in period 2 the center wants to bail out the firm. Thus, the dynamic inconsistency problem brought about by the inability to commit not to bail out the firm
softens the budget. In our model, by contrast, there is no time inconsistency problem,
as the government does not face a commitment problem, and wants to renegotiate. The
budget constraint is soft because a renegotiation allows the incumbent to elude spend9
The Chilean concession program is considered among a handful of well established PPP programs
(Hemming, 2005), solidly based in the Law, with well specified conflict resolution procedures (IMF, 2005).
Detailed data on concession contracts are available on the webpage of the Ministry of Public Works and
the quality of fiscal accounting can be described at par with average OECD levels.
10
According to the Chilean Concession Law, when the firm and regulator are unable to reach an agreement in a bilateral negotiation, the firm (and only the firm) can bring the case to an arbitration panel.
11
This is noteworthy since international indicators (World Bank Governance Indicators and World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report) indicate that the quality of regulations in Chile are above
the OECD average.
12
See Kornai et al. (2003) for a synthesis of this literature.
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ing limits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes our argument and
derives some observable implications. Section 3 presents evidence from the Chilean
PPP program on these observable implications. This is followed by the conclusion and
an appendix with an extension of the model.

2 A simple model of renegotiations
2.1 Model
There are two periods, each corresponding to the term of one administration. There is
an election at the end of the first period. The discount rate is zero and social welfare is
U = u(I 1 ) + u(I 2 ),

(1)

where u is strictly increasing and strictly concave and I t denotes the ability to provide
infrastructure services in period t .13 The construction industry and the PPP industry
are competitive, infrastructure fully depreciates in one period and each unit of capacity
costs $1 and is costless to operate.
Infrastructure must be financed with an exogenous sequence of taxes Ti that satisfies
T1 + T2 = 1,

(2)

I 1 + I 2 = 1.

(3)

so that the budget constraint is

That is, over time infrastructure spending cannot exceed 1.14 The following result follows immediately:
Result 1 I 1s characterized by u 0 (I 1s ) = u 0 (1 − I 1s ) maximizes (1) subject to (3). It follows
that socially optimal investment in periods 1 and 2 satisfies I 1s = I 2s = 12 . This investment
13

In addition to decreasing returns to infrastructure, there are other reasons for concavity of utility. For
example, if there are no alternative suppliers to the firms already operating in the country (assuming
that it is costly —e.g., takes too long— to invite additional international firms), increasing investment
leads to more market power of the firms, so it is inefficient to bunch most investments in the first period.
Alternatively, input (materials and specialized labor) costs go up when most investment takes place in the
first period, again leading to higher prices.
14
It is straightforward to extend the model to include user fee revenue, but this would add little to the
analysis in this paper.
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program is feasible.
Congress wants to maximize social welfare (1) and can impose a spending cap I¯1 .15
The government can issue debt in period 1, constrained by (2) and the spending cap
imposed by Congress. The incumbent executive has a reelection concern: if p is the
probability of reelection, her payoff is
G (I 1 , I 2 ) = u(I 1 ) + p(I 1 )u(I 2 ),

(4)

where p is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and u > 0, so that p(I 1 )u(I 2 ) is increasing in I 1 for any fixed value of I 2 . Note that the incumbent’s preferences coincide
with social welfare in period 1, but that she values period’s 2 welfare only when in power.
What is the rationale for the incumbent’s objective function (4)? The probability of
reelection may increase with infrastructure spending because voters are irrational and
prefer investments now, before the election.16 An alternative interpretation comes from
the political economy literature. Hillman (1982), suggests that governments choose policies by balancing the political benefits of support from industry (through campaign
contributions) against the dissatisfaction of consumers from inefficient investments.
Higher industry profits are exchanged in return for political contributions, which raises
the probability of reelection, but also increases the welfare loss and, therefore, the dissatisfaction of voters. It is straightforward to see that in a neighborhood of I 1s =

1
2

the

welfare loss to consumers will be second order while the benefit for the incumbent of
increased political support is first order; it follows that I 1 will be larger than I 1s in equilibrium.
2.1.1 Conventional provision vs. public-private partnerships
There are two alternative ways of procuring infrastructure: conventional provision and
public-private partnerships. In both cases Congress grants an authorization to the government to spend at most I¯1 = I s = 1 in period 1 (see Figure 1 for a time-line). This
1

2

15

The assumption that Congress’ and society’s interests coincide seems contrary to experience. It is
based on the fact that in Congress there is an opposition party that reacts against increased (federal)
spending with reelection purposes, whereas the executive has no corresponding opposition. The power of
the purse is the main source of power of Congress in democratic societies, and it is active only in opposition to government. Our point is that Congress’ oversight on electoral spending tends to reduce excesses,
though it is probably still not optimal. In this sense, our simplification is analogous to assuming that the
less risk averse party in a standard principal-agent problem is risk neutral.
16
Cadot et al. (2006) present a model of pork-barrel infrastructure spending where future voters are not
represented in the current election
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constraint can be interpreted in two ways. In the first interpretation, the services of infrastructure provided in period 1 cannot exceed I 1 = 21 , this is the “services limit” interpretation. In the second interpretation, actual expenditures on infrastructure in period
1 cannot exceed 12 , this is the “expenditure limit” interpretation. Both interpretations are
not equivalent when the infrastructure contracted in period 1 is partly paid for in period
2, as will be the case under PPPs. Nevertheless the insight and result we derive below
hold, with minor modifications, for both cases.
The specifics of expenditure oversight vary from country to country. In some countries infrastructure projects must pass a social cost-benefit evaluation. In other countries, PPP projects must pass a value-for-money test which compares costs with conventional provision.17 In these cases the “services limit” interpretation for the spending cap
is appropriate. Yet in other countries the public works authority faces spending limits
imposed and enforced by the finance authority and the “expenditure limit” interpretation applies.
Following Maskin and Tirole (2008) we assume that PPPs make hidden intertemporal transfers possible. That is, because PPPs bundle finance with construction and
operation, the government can make a credible promise to repay in the future for infrastructure that firms build in the present. Furthermore, these promises do not enter
budgetary discussion until the period they are disbursed. By contrast, there is no mechanism available to backload payments under conventional provision.
Governments can backload payments under PPPs in a variety of ways other than the
one considered in our model. For example, the government can extend the duration
of the concession contract, raise future user fees, offer additional revenue guarantees,
promise for increases in future subsidies, or lower the quality standards the firm must
comply with. In all these cases the incumbent is transferring resources, mainly from
future administrations and users, to the firm, circumventing budgetary control.
Conventional provision As mentioned above, Congress grants an authorization to the
government to spend at most I 1s = 21 . Under conventional provision, the government
then procures I 1 =

1
2

in a competitive auction and the construction company builds the

project. At the end of period 1 the government collects taxes T1 , issues debt D = 21 − T1 ,
and repays the construction company (see the left panel in Figure 1 for the time-line).18
Note that in period 1, net borrowing D equals
17

1
2

− T1 . Hence, under existing budgetary

There is anecdotal evidence that PPP units understate costs to meet the test.
In practice, construction companies finance their operation mainly with short-term bank loans,
which they must repay when the works are completed.
18

6

practices Congress can also impose an effective limit by capping net borrowing at 12 −T1 .
Because (3) must hold, I 2 = 1 − I 1 . Thus, in period 2 the government procures I 2 = 12 ,
collects taxes T2 , pays the construction company and repays debt D. Then the game
ends.
Public-private partnerships Under this contractual relationship, the infrastructure is
financed, built and operated by a private firm. Congress imposes the same spending
cap as in the case of conventional provision, I¯1 = I s = 1 , and the government allocates
1

2

the PPP in a competitive auction where firms bid for the total payment B they demand
in order to finance, build and operate the infrastructure I¯1 . The lowest bidder becomes
the concessionaire, with a contract {B ; 21 }, which entitles him to receive B at the end of
period 1. The expenditure limit interpretation for the spending cap implies that B ≤ 21 .19
According to the time-line depicted in the right panel of Figure 1, after the PPP contract is signed, but before the infrastructure is built, the incumbent renegotiates and
agrees on an amount ² in additional works in exchange for R in additional payments to
the concessionaire. Part of these payments are made in period 2. Hence, they sign the
new contract {B + R; 12 + ²} and the concessionaire builds

1
2

+ ² units of infrastructure in

period 1, for a total payment of B + R.
Below, we determine the equilibrium values for B , R and ². Before doing so it is
instructive to discuss how a renegotiation can be used to elude the spending cap imposed by Congress. The timing of payments is important. Denoting by P 1 the amount
promised to the firm in period 1 according to the renegotiated contract, as long as B ≤
P 1 ≤ 21 , the spending cap is met and the government’s net borrowing appears to be
D = P 1 − T1 .
Nevertheless, in addition to D the government assumes a contractual commitment to
pay (B + R) − P 1 in period 2. Hence, the government’s true net borrowing in period 1 is
[(B + R) − P 1 ] + D = (B + R) − T1 .
In period 2 the contractual obligation appears in the budget and is binding. Hence, the
amount that can be allocated to construction is I 2 = 1−(B +R). At the end of the period,
The initial contract auctioned by the government could be for more than 12 , since firms may bid less
than their cost in the expectation of the profits they will make after the renegotiation. We consider this
possibility later in this section.
19
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the government collects taxes of T2 , pays 1−(B +R) to the construction company for the
second period construction, pays (B + R) − P 1 to the concessionaire, and repays debt D.
It might appear that direct congressional oversight of PPPs can substitute for budgetary accounting, but this does not occur. PPP contracts tend to be renegotiated by the
individual agencies that signed them, as they have the expertise to evaluate the costs and
benefits of the modifications. The new obligations are normally ignored by the budget
office because they are registered in complex bilateral contracts that are signed when
the renegotiation occurs. Even when the budget office has oversight over the negotiation process, Congress may still be ill informed about the obligations. For example,
referring to a related issue, Hemming et al. (2005) point out that in many countries it is
very difficult to obtain information about minimum income guarantees provided in PPP
contracts, which tend to be granted by individual ministries, and not by the government
budget office.

2.2 Soft budgets, renegotiations and PPPs
We now show that an incumbent can exploit PPPs to anticipate spending. First we show
that an unconstrained incumbent would like to spend more than what Congress allows
under conventional provision. Next we show that the incumbent can use renegotiations
to attain her optimum.
2.2.1 Two benchmarks
The unconstrained government Assume a government constrained only by (3). Then
the incumbent sets I 1 to satisfy the necessary FOC
d G (I 1 , 1 − I 1 )
= u 0 (I 1∗ ) − p(I 1∗ )u 0 (1 − I 1∗ ) + p 0 (I 1∗ )u(1 − I 1∗ ) = 0,
d I1

(5)

with SOC
d 2G
d I 12

= u 00 (I 1∗ ) + p(I 1∗ )u 00 (1 − I 1∗ ) − 2p 0 (I 1∗ )u 0 (1 − I 1∗ ) + p 00 (I 1∗ )u(1 − I 1∗ ) < 0,

since u and p are concave and increasing, and u > 0.
We now show that I 1∗ > 21 . To begin, assume that p 0 = p 00 = 0, that is, there is a fixed
probability of reelection p ∈ [0, 1]. Denote the corresponding optimal investment in in-

8

p

frastructure during period 1 by I 1 . The FOC simplifies to
p

p

u 0 (I 1 ) − pu 0 (1 − I 1 ) = 0.
Result 1 corresponds to the case where p = 1. Implicit differentiation of the FOC shows
that

p

p

d I1
dp
p

Hence, I 1 > I 1s =

1
2

=

u 0 (1 − I 1 )
p

p

u 00 (I 1 ) + pu 00 (1 − I 1 )

< 0.

for p < 1. This result is well known (see Alesina and Tabellini [1990]):

the incumbent tends to anticipate spending because future infrastructure spending is
discounted by more than the social discount factor.
We return to the first order condition (5) with p a function of I . We define p eq as the
fixed probability such that the incumbent would optimally choose to spend I 1∗ , that is
u 0 (I 1∗ ) ≡ p eq u 0 (1 − I 1∗ ).
Now from the FOC (5) we have
u 0 (I 1∗ ) = p(I 1∗ )u 0 (1 − I 1∗ ) − p 0 (I 1∗ )u(1 − I 1∗ ).
It follows that
p eq = p(I 1∗ ) − p 0 (I 1∗ )
p∗

u(1 − I 1∗ )
u 0 (1 − I 1∗ )

.

p∗

Hence p eq < p(I 1∗ ) and I 1∗ > I 1 > I 1s , where I 1 denotes optimal government expenditure for a government with constant p equal to p(I 1∗ ) and we recall that I 1s =

1
2

denotes

socially optimal government expenditure.
Thus, there are two reasons why the current government wants to anticipate spending. First, the coalition may not be in office in the future: p < 1 acts as a discount rate
that discounts future utility more than is socially desirable. Second, more spending today increases the probability of reelection. Hence, the government’s expenditure not
only depends on its probability of being re-elected, p(I 1∗ ), but also on how responsive
this probability is to changes in expenditures. A more responsive probability leads to
higher expenditures, even when the actual probability of being re-elected remains unchanged.
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Conventional provision Result 1 implies that socially optimal expenditure in period 1
equals 12 . Under conventional provision Congress implements the optimal sequence of
investments by setting a spending limit I¯1 = I s = 1 . Since I ∗ > I¯1 , this spending limit is
1

2

1

binding.
2.2.2 Implementing the incumbent’s optimum with a renegotiation
Assume that Congress sets a spending cap I¯1 = 21 and that the incumbent auctions a PPP
contract for I 1 = 12 . We now show that by renegotiating the PPP contract the government
can anticipate spending and implement her optimum, I 1∗ .
As noted before, if the incumbent and the concessionaire agree to ² in additional
works against R in additional revenues, the concessionaire receives B + R and spends
1
2

+ ². The incumbent, in turn, is left with 1 − (B + R) to spend in period 2. Hence after

renegotiation her utility increases to
u( 12 + ²) + p( 12 + ²)u(1 − B − R).

(6)

Now note that the concessionaire receives a rent R ≡ R − ² when renegotiating. Rational expectations on the part of potential concessionaires implies that this rent will affect
bids in the auction for the PPP contract—i.e. it will stimulate lowballing. Denoting the
amount that is lowballed by φ ≡ I 1 − B = 12 − B we have that competition in the auction
implies that the firm’s total profit will equal zero. That is, competition eliminates rents
and, therefore, the concessionaire’s lowballing equals her expected gain in the renegotiation.
Result 2 B + R = I 1 + ² = 21 + ² and φ = R.
Below, we show that the firm will renegotiate in order to circumvent the spending
limit imposed by Congress, and in this way achieve its optimum. The main idea is as
follows. The firm lowballs during the auction, in the expectation of recovering the deficit
during the renegotiation stage. If the firm lowballs by too much, the maximum rent it
can obtain in the renegotiation stage is insufficient for it to break even. By contrast, if the
firm lowballs by too little, the government is willing to pay a large premium (larger than
the amount lowballed) in order to have additional infrastructure. In turn, this excess in
renegotiation rents attract more aggressive bids on the auction. In equilibrium, the firm
lowballs in the auction by the exact amount it will obtain in renegotiation rents.
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The interesting question is what enables the government to attain its bliss point.
This is due to two facts: competition in the initial stage eliminates ex post rents, plus
the assumption that bargaining is efficient. This last condition implies that, thanks to
the renegotiation, the government’s desired first period investment I 1∗ is part of the bargaining frontier, and since the firm gets nothing overall, the government can achieve its
desired first period investment.
To provide formal derivations, it is instructive to consider first the cases where one
of the parties has all the bargaining power.
The firm has all the bargaining power
In this case, the firm maximizes its profits subject to maintaining the utility of the
government at the level it would obtain if no renegotiation takes place. It therefore
solves:
max²,R
s.t.

R −²
u( 12

+ ²) + p( 21

(7)
+ ²)u( 12

+ φ − R) = u( 12 ) + p( 12 )u( 21

+ φ).

(8)

Note that the renegotiation allows the incumbent to achieve a debt-like intertemporal transfer. Current infrastructure spending rises by ², at the cost of R.
The first order conditions for the problem stated above and some straightforward algebra lead to the following condition for the additional infrastructure contracted during
the renegotiation stage, ²∗ :
u 0 ( 21 + ²∗ ) + p 0 ( 21 + ²∗ )u( 21 + φ − R) − p( 12 + ²∗ )u 0 ( 12 + φ − R) = 0.
Rational lowballing on the part of the firm (Result 2) implies that R = φ + ²∗ , so that
u 0 ( 12 + ²∗ ) + p 0 ( 21 + ²∗ )u( 12 − ²∗ ) − p( 12 + ²∗ )u 0 ( 12 − ²∗ ) = 0.
This condition is equivalent to condition (5) that determines the government’s optimal
investment schedule. Therefore the government will contract for additional works to the
amount ²∗ = I 1∗ − 12 during the renegotiation. We also have that the equilibrium amount
of lowballing during the auction for I 1 , φ∗ , satisfies:
u(I 1∗ ) + p(I 1∗ )u(1 − I 1∗ ) = u( 21 ) + p( 12 )u( 21 + φ∗ ).
The firm lowballs by φ∗ during the auction for I 1 = 21 , anticipating that it will make ex
11

post rents equal to φ∗ when it renegotiates the contract.
The government has all the bargaining power
In this case the government pays the firm at cost (i.e., without any rents) for any additional infrastructure contracted during the renegotiation, and therefore chooses ² to
maximize:
u( 12 + ²) + p( 12 + ²)u( 12 + φ − ²),
where φ = 21 − B denotes the amount lowballed during the auction.
The optimal level of infrastructure contracted during renegotiation, ²∗ , then satisfies
u 0 ( 12 + ²∗ ) + p 0 ( 12 + ²∗ )u( 12 + φ − ²∗ ) − p( 12 + ²∗ )u 0 ( 12 + ²∗ ) = 0.

(9)

From the zero profit condition (Result 2) we have that φ = 0 in (9). Comparing with (5)
then shows that the government contracts ²∗ = I 1∗ − 12 during the renegotiation, thereby
implementing its optimum.
The intuition is the following: when making its bid to build I 1 = 21 , the firm is aware
that it will have no bargaining power when renegotiating the contract, and therefore will
not obtain rents that could allow it to recover from any lowballing. For this reason, it
does not lowball and bids B = 21 . It follows that φ = 0.
General case
When considering the general case, where both the government and the firm have
bargaining power during the renegotiation, the intuition is similar to what we discussed
in the case where the firm has all the bargaining power. The firm lowballs in the expectation of recovering the first period deficit with the renegotiation rents. The proof of the
result is complicated by the fact that the firm and government measure their utility in
different units, and we present it in the appendix. Here we state the result.
Result 3 Assuming a competitive auction for I 1 =

1
2

and efficient bargaining during the

renegotiation that follows, in equilibrium the incumbent uses the renegotiation to implement her optimum, regardless of the distribution of bargaining power. The firm lowballs
in the initial auction by φ∗ that solves
u(I 1∗ ) + p(I 1∗ )u(1 − I 1∗ ) = p( 21 ) + p( 12 )u( 12 +

φ∗
),
α

(10)

where α ∈ [0, 1] denotes the firm’s share of surplus. It follows that φ∗ is increasing in α with
φ∗ (0) = 0. As long as the firm has some bargaining power (α > 0), additional spending
12

contracted during the renegotiation is used both to pay for the new infrastructure and to
compensate lowballing in the auction.
Proof See the Appendix.

Note that the split of the ex post surplus, and therefore, the ex post rent made by the
concessionaire depends on his bargaining power, α. Nevertheless, our assumption of ex
ante competition in the auction implies that the concessionaire will not make rents overall, as any ex post rent is a remuneration for ex ante lowballing. This has an interesting
implication: suppose Congress makes it a law that additional works must be awarded
after a competitive auction that forces a competitive price ²∗ for these additional works.
This procedure does not prevent spending anticipation: its only effect is to prevent lowballing in the initial auction. By imposing no rents during the renegotiation, Congress
shifts all bargaining power to the government during the renegotiation. Nevertheless, as
shown above, the government can attain its optimum nonetheless, since the additional
expenditure on infrastructure is paid for in period 2 and therefore is not subject to the
spending constraint imposed by Congress in period 1.
Second, note that with PPP contracts the initial bid for the project is B = 12 − φ∗ , at a
net loss of φ∗ for the firm, while the amount paid by the government in the renegotiation
equals φ∗ + ²∗ , for infrastructure that is worth ²∗ . Thus, if α > 0, the results of the renegotiation includes additional compensation for the works originally contracted as well
as for additional works not contemplated in the original contract. In other words, “cost
overruns,” which are often cited in practice as the reason for renegotiating, are brought
about endogenously, by initial lowballing.
Third, lowballing implies B < 21 whenever α > 0. Hence, the government is left with a
first period surplus that can be used to pay for the results of renegotiation. Thus, some
of the additional compensation of the concessionaire is paid from the current budget.
Fourth, observe that renegotiations are an effective means of anticipating spending
only if a significant part of the amounts renegotiated are not paid by the current administration. This is the main prediction of the model.20 The future administration has
1
2

− ²∗ to spend in period 2 instead of the social optimal 21 .
We note that we assumed the infrastructure auctioned initially equals the spending

limit imposed by Congress: I 1 = 21 . This is one of many auctions that lead, after renegoti20

Observe the difference between this prediction and having additional spending by emitting bonds or
borrowing in the market: in the case of PPPs, the lender is the firm and there is no clear supervision of the
additional spending.
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ation, to the incumbent’s optimal infrastructure level I 1∗ . For example, when the spending cap is interpreted as a limit on expenditures, it is feasible to have I 1 > 12 , coupled to
a winning bid B that does not exceed the spending cap 12 .21
2.2.3 A suggested solution
Spending anticipation is not inherent to PPPs. Indeed, conventional provision and PPPs
share the same information structure, and have insignificant differences as far as delegation is concerned—both delegate infrastructure procurement in a government agency
which reports directly to the executive, rather than to an independent supervisory body.
The difference is due to defective accounting standards, which interact with two specific
aspects of PPPs.
The first characteristic is that PPPs bundle finance, construction and operation into
one contract, which allows the incumbent to renegotiate all dimensions of the contract
with the concessionaire simultaneously. The second characteristic is that PPP laws and
regulations impose constraints mainly (in many countries only) on the original PPP contract. As we already mentioned, some countries may require that PPPs pass a social
cost-benefit analysis; others require PPPs to pass a value-for-money test. The constraint
limits the spending by the government (i.e., it sets I 1 to the optimal social value I 1s ) and
implies that the incumbent must renegotiate the original contract in order to increase
spending to I 1∗ > I 1s .
Nevertheless, this problem has a straightforward solution that can be implemented
within existing budgetary practices: the government should count any infrastructure
procured via PPPs as current investment.
To see why this solves the problem, we return to our model. Under the proposed
solution, B + R will be registered as government infrastructure spending in period 1,
and the government’s net borrowing will appear to be B + R − T1 . Thus a cap on total
spending B + R, or on net borrowing equal to I 1s − T1 would lead to B + R ≤ I 1s . In other
words, the reformulated cap forces the government to cut other investments if it wishes
to renegotiate.22
Result 3 applies to the case where I 1 < 21 as well. In this case, the firm lowballs by including additional
works (above 12 ) initially, but charges less than 12 for it. Defining φ∗ (I 1 ) in a manner analogous to what we
did for I 1 = 12 , we have that as long as I 1 − φ∗ (I 1 ) ≤ 21 the spending limit for period 1 won’t be exceeded
and the renegotiation achieves the incumbent’s optimum. The resulting function φ∗ (I 1 ) is decreasing in
I 1 . Thus, independent of how we interpret the spending cap imposed by Congress, the incumbent uses
renegotiations to circumvent the spending caps and achieve her optimum.
22
Engel et al. (2007) study the public finance of PPPs in a model where incentives play no role, and show
that optimal budgetary accounting of PPPs requires that they appear as a deficit item upfront, indepen21
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Including privately-financed assets in the public sector’s balance sheet has been already proposed by Donaghue (2002, p. 9). Donaghue shows, however, that the conventional approach has been to classify assets as owned by the concessionaire during the
term of the concession. One exception is the auditor-general of New South Wales in
Australia, who determined that the asset and liabilities of privately financed bulk-water
treatment plants belonged to the public sector’s balance sheet.23

2.3 Accounting of PPPs by government entities
According to Hemming et al. (2005), there is a hierarchy of government accounting standards. At the highest level there is the International Public Sector Accounting Standard (IPSAS). When there is no rule in the IPSAS covering an issue, government entities
should comply with the International Financing Reporting Standards (IFRS) under the
interpretation of the International Accounting Standards (IAS). The big issue concerning PPPs is how to incorporate them into the government accounts. Eurostat (2004) has
made recommendations based on who bears the construction, availability and demand
risks. If the private partner bears at least two of these three sources of risk, including
among them the construction risk, Eurostat recommends that assets built by PPPs be
classified as nongovernmental and therefore recorded off the balance sheet. This does
not account for the fact that PPP contracts are assumed to assign risks to the party that
can best manage them.
2.3.1 Revenue guarantees
Many PPP contracts include minimum revenue guarantees, i.e., a promise that the government will pay the difference between the user fee revenue generated by the project
and a predetermined revenue flow. Accounting for revenue guarantees has proven difficult, and while there is a literature on the topic, there is no consensus on how to incorporate them into the public accounts.24 Here we argue that guarantees can also be used
to elude spending limits.
In Engel et al. (2007) we show that revenue guarantees correspond to (contingent)
subsidies for the concessionaires. In addition to these issues, in many countries guarantees are poorly documented, as we have already mentioned. Moreover, since guarantees
depend on the state of demand for the project, there is no consensus on how to deal
dent of whether the source of payments is the public budget or revenues generated by the project.
23
Harris (1998), cited in Irwin (2007, p. 113)
24
See, for example, Hemming et al. (2005), Irwin (2007).

15

with the associated risk. Most importantly, as Hemming (2005, p. 40) notes, under current accounting standards for government entities, many future obligations will remain
hidden. For example, under cash accounting for government entities, guarantees are apparent only when they are paid, in which case they appear as current expenditure. And
under accrual accounting for government entities, a guarantee is recorded as a liability only if the government considers that the probability of making a payment is higher
than 0.5 and can make a reasonable estimate of the amount to be paid. In that case the
liability is formally recognized by creating a provision, but this is a financial management decision that is not covered by the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual.25
Therefore, unless the government makes a provision and sets funds aside, guarantees
are recorded only when they are called.
2.3.2 Guarantees and spending caps
The previous analysis shows that a guarantee G is equivalent to additional revenue for
the concessionaire, which, if callable in period 2, can be used to elude the spending cap
in period 1. Two implications follow. First, in terms of anticipating spending, revenue
guarantees and renegotiations are almost perfect substitutes. It follows that reducing
the scope of renegotiation may induce the government to offer larger guarantees so as to
continue spending more than the cap, and conversely, that better accounting for guarantees will stimulate renegotiation. Second, the solution to avoid that guarantees be
used to overspend is the same as the solution to the renegotiation problem discussed
above: force the government to include as current spending all expenditures, both current and future, associated with PPP investment. Thus, in general, for budgetary accounting purposes, infrastructure investment under PPPs should be treated in the same
way as investments under the conventional approach.

3 Evidence from the Chilean PPP program
3.1 Concession program
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Chilean concession program is considered among
a handful of well established PPP programs (Hemming, 2005). Detailed data on concession contracts are available on the webpage of the Ministry of Public Works (MOP by
25

The Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM, see IMF, 2001) “integrates flows and stocks and
shifts the emphasis toward accrual reporting and balance sheets”, Hemming et al. (2005).
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its Spanish acronym) and the quality of fiscal accounting can be described at par with
average OECD levels.
Chilean PPPs were launched in 1993 with the El Melón tunnel concession. As shown
in Table 1, between 1993 and 2006, MOP awarded 50 PPPs: 26 roads, 10 airports, three
jails, two water reservoirs, five public transportation infrastructure projects and four
other miscellaneous projects. As shown in Table 2, however, roads are the main component of the PPP program, as they account for 89% of the $11.3 billion invested (column
6).26,27

3.2 Renegotiations
By 2007, there had been 148 renegotiations of PPP contracts, and therefore each concession had been renegotiated three times on average. Renegotiations led to an increase of
$2.8 billion, or nearly one-third, in total investment, from $8.5 billion to $11.3 billion. As
can be seen from Figure 2, however, there is substantial variation among different types
of infrastructure. On average, the largest increases correspond to urban highways and
to jails, with average increments of more than 50%.
The following two examples illustrate how the government has used renegotiations
to circumvent Congressional approval for increased expenditures.
The rainwater collectors In 2001 there was flooding in Santiago, which led to political pressures on the government to invest in main collectors that would drain the rain
waters from flood-prone areas. Since the government was unwilling to obtain the necessary resources from the budget or through increased indebtedness, it decided to renegotiate the contracts of the urban highways scheduled for construction so that they would
build the drains. The sums involved were hundreds of millions of dollars and required
changes to the contracts of three urban concessions during the construction phase. The
initial payments for the additional works were scheduled to begin several years in the
future.
The San Antonio Bypass The main port of Chile was hampered by the fact that trucks
had to go through the city of San Antonio to reach the port. The government decided to
add a special access route to the port that bypassed the city. There were three options
26

Chile’s GDP is currently about $160 billion, and at the time of completion of the main projects, these
represented about 10% of GDP.
27
A detailed description of the data base can be found in Engel et al. (2009).
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to finance the project: i) to fund it with fiscal resources, ii) through an independent
self-financed tolled concession or iii) as a non-tolled extension to the Route 78, from
Santiago to San Antonio. The then President had promised the city, while a candidate,
that he would not impose a toll on the proposed access. Even though the government
had ample access to the international credit markets, it decided to renegotiate the contract, valuing the 8 km project at around US$ 45 million. The payment consisted in a
substantial increase in tolls, and a further increase in 2012. It is not clear whether the
expected revenue from increased tolls corresponds to the value of the project.

3.3 How and what is renegotiated?
The Chilean concessions law allows for two possible channels to renegotiate concession
contracts. In a bilateral renegotiation either MOP or the concessionaire can initiate the
process and bargain until they reach an acceptable agreement. The agreement is then
formalized via a publicly available annex to the original contract, which describes the
aspects that were renegotiated, values additional investments, indicates the timing of
additional payments and states the sources of funds that will be used to pay the amounts
that were renegotiated.
Contracts can also be modified by the concessionaire appealing to a panel. These
appeals usually occur if the government and the concessionaire cannot reach an agreement during the bilateral renegotiation. There is one panel per PPP, each with three
members, one designated by MOP, another by the concessionaire and the third, who
must be a lawyer, named by mutual agreement. In a first stage the panel attempts to
conciliate the positions of both parties. If the conciliation stage fails, the panel arbitrates between the positions.28 There are no appeals to the panel’s decisions, except for
procedural issues. Under the current Chilean concessions law, the government cannot
present a dispute with the concessionaire to the panel.
Bilateral renegotiations are reviewed by other government agencies, in particular the
Finance Ministry, but are not subject to independent review. By contrast, renegotiations
before a panel are subject to the examination of outsiders (even though they are chosen
by MOP and the concessionaire).
More detailed information is available for bilateral renegotiations than for renegotiations before a panel. In particular, a break up of the amount renegotiated into how much
goes to pay for existing infrastructure and how much for additions is only available for
28

Formally, the panels operate as conciliation panels in the first stage and as arbitration panels in the
second stage of the process.
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bilateral renegotiations.
As can be seen in Figure 3, there were 78 (out of 148) bilateral renegotiations, while
the rest were appeals to the panel. Hence, bilateral renegotiations represent little more
than 50% of all processes. Nevertheless, 83% of the renegotiated amounts, corresponding to $2.3 billion, were awarded in bilateral renegotiations. Of this amount, 84%, or
$1.96 billion, were designated as additional investments, with the remaining $360 million, were designated as additional payments for originally contracted works.29 According to the records, 66 of the 78 bilateral renegotiations were initiated by MOP.30

3.4 When do renegotiations occur?
As we pointed out in the Introduction, industry participants often defend renegotiations
by arguing that PPPs are long-term, incomplete contracts, and that conditions change
over the life of the concession. For example, traffic on a road may grow faster than expected, and this could warrant building additional lanes of a highway before the end of
the concession. In contrast, in our model renegotiations occur during construction.
Figure 4 shows that 51 of 78 bilateral renegotiations, corresponding to 78% of the total amount renegotiated, took place during construction, which is evidence against the
interpretation of renegotiations as the response to long-term, incomplete contracts. By
contrast, less than half of the $490 million awarded by arbitration panels occurred during construction. Evidently, our data is censored, because most concessions have not
completed their term. Nevertheless, the point is that renegotiations during construction are significant, a fact that is hard to rationalize under the long term incomplete
contracts interpretation of renegotiation, whereas it is predicted by the model presented
in this paper.

3.5 The timing of compensations
Our analysis implies that future administrations bear the cost of renegotiations by incumbents. Figure 5 shows that only 35% of the $2.3 billion that were awarded through
bilateral renegotiations was paid by the incumbent administration. Most of the remaining amount will be borne by future administrations, and a final fraction by users, via
higher tolls and contract extension.
29

We were unable to determine the division into these two components in the case of arbitrations, given
the available information.
30
Industry insiders suggest that it is politically more acceptable if it looks as if MOP rather than the
concessionaire starts the renegotiation process.
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It is interesting to contrast bilateral renegotiations with arbitration panels. In that
case, 61% of the awards were paid by the administration involved in the dispute.

3.6 Renegotiation caps
When a concession is auctioned in Chile, firms must submit an estimate of the cost of
the project as part of their bid. The current Chilean concessions law states that additional investments added during the term of the concession cannot exceed 15% of this
estimate, unless the concession contract specifies it explicitly. Of the 50 concession contracts, 39 established ad-hoc caps. During construction the caps range from 5% to 15%,
and from 10% to 30% for the whole term of the concession. This is an attempt to limit
renegotiations; it is interesting to examine the effectiveness of caps.
Table 3 shows data for those concession contracts that exceeded their cap. In each
case, we compute the dollar value of the limit on renegotiations, and then compare the
total limit over all the concessions with the total amount effectively renegotiated.
Column 1 indicates that 16 concessions exceeded their caps during construction,
and 11 had exceeded their overall renegotiation caps by 2007. During construction, aggregate caps were $367 million; but renegotiations were $1.6 billion, i.e., 4.3 times the
predefined limit. During the term of the concession total caps added up to $483 million;
while the amounts renegotiated were $1.6 billion. We conclude that caps are ineffective
tools to limit renegotiation.

3.7 Taking Stock
Combining bilateral and panel renegotiations, we have that 73% of the total amount was
renegotiated shortly after the concession was auctioned, that is during the construction phase. This is consistent with the prediction of our model and inconsistent with
the interpretation of renegotiations as the response to long-term, incomplete contracts.
Furthermore, only 40% of the $2.8 billion that were awarded through renegotiations was
paid by the incumbent administration, suggesting that renegotiations help governments
increase expenditures by circumventing budgetary controls.
For those renegotiations where data is available, 84% of the sums contracted were
designated as additional investments, with the remaining 16% designated as additional
payments for works included in the original contract. This is consistent with lowballing
by firms in the original auction, as suggested by our model.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the predictions of our model hold to a larger extent for
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bilateral renegotiations than for panel renegotiations. We do not have information to
account for the endogeneity of the choice of renegotiation and therefore leave possible
explanations for this finding for future research.

4 Conclusions
We have shown that, from the point of view of incumbent governments, PPPs have the
advantage of allowing them to exceed spending limits. This is because poor accounting
standards allow governments to use renegotiations to increase spending without oversight. This feature of renegotiations leads to observable predictions, namely that (i) in a
competitive market, firms lowball their offers, expecting to break even through renegotiation, (ii) renegotiations compensate lowballing and add additional expenditure, (iii) the
government uses renegotiation to increase spending and shift the burden of payments
to future administrations, (iv) there are significant renegotiations during construction.
We use data on Chilean renegotiations of concessions to examine these predictions and
find that the data are consistent with the results of our model.
We also show that a simple change to fiscal accounting could eliminate this problem,
namely by including PPP investment, including renegotiations, as current expenditure.
On the other hand, the data show that alternatives, such as contractual limits, are ineffective in that role.
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A PPENDIX

Proof of Result 3.
Assume the firm bids B for building infrastructure 21 , so that it lowballs by φ = 21 − B ,
To determine the equilibrium value of φ we analyze the renegotiation, conditional on φ.
The government’s utility gain from contracting infrastructure ² at a cost R during the
renegotiation equals
S (², R; φ) ≡ u( 12 + ²) + p( 21 + ²)u( 12 + φ − R) − u( 12 ) − p( 12 )u( 21 + φ).
The second period monetary equivalent of this gain, M 2 (², R), is defined via:31
S (², R; φ) = u( 12 ) + p( 12 )u( 21 + φ + M 2 ) − u( 12 ) − p( 12 )u( 21 + φ),
which leads to
u( 12 + ²) − u( 21 ) = p( 12 )u( 21 + φ + M 2 ) − p( 12 + ²)u( 12 + φ − R).

(11)

Implicit differentiation w.r.t. ² and R implies:
1
0 1
2
u 0 ( 12 + ²) = p( 21 )u 0 ( 12 + φ + M 2 ) ∂M
∂² − p ( 2 + ²)u( 2 + φ − R),

(12)

+ p( 12 + ²)u 0 ( 12 + φ − R).

(13)

0 =

2
p( 21 )u 0 ( 12 + φ + M 2 ) ∂M
∂R

Total surplus to be split during renegotiation equals:
[R − ²] + M 2 (², R; φ),

(14)

where the term in square brackets represents the firm’s profit while the second term
corresponds to the government’s monetary gain. Maximizing total surplus w.r.t. ² and R
leads to the FOC:
∂M 2
∂²
∂M 2
∂R

= 1,
= −1.

Substituting these expressions in (12) y (13) and adding both expressions yields:
u 0 ( 12 + ²) + p 0 ( 21 + ²)u( 12 + φ − R) − p( 12 + ²)u 0 ( 12 + φ − R) = 0.
31

A similar proof holds if we work with the first period monetary equivalent.
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(15)

Imposing the zero profit condition we have R = φ + ². Substituting this expression for
R in (15) and comparing with (5) shows that the equilibrium value for infrastructure
contracted during the renegotiation, ²∗ , satisfies ²∗ = I 1∗ − 21 . The government therefore
attains its optimum.
We complete the proof by deriving (10). If the firm’s surplus share is α, then
φ∗ = R − ²∗ = α[R − ²∗ + M 2 (²∗ , R; φ)] = α[φ∗ + M 2 (²∗ , φ∗ + ²∗ ; φ∗ )],
where the first and third equalities follow from Result 2. Therefore
φ∗ = α[φ∗ + M 2∗ ],

(16)

with M 2∗ ≡ M 2∗ (²∗ , φ∗ + ²∗ ; φ∗ ). It follows from (11) that φ∗ + M 2∗ is determined from:
u(I 1∗ ) − u( 21 ) = p( 21 )u( 12 + φ∗ + M 2∗ ) − p(I 1∗ )u(1 − I 1∗ ).
Using (16) to substitute φ∗ /α for φ∗ + M 2∗ leads to (10) and completes the proof.
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Table 1
Chilean PPPs, 1993-20061

Highways
Pan American Highway (Route 5)

Urban highways

Jails

1. Los Vilos-La Serena [1997, 25] [3, 0]
2. Santiago-Los Vilos [1996, 23] [3, 7]
3. Santiago-Talca [1998, 25] [5, 10]
4. Talca-Chillán [1996, 19] [5, 3]
5. Chillán-Collipulli [1997, 23] [3, 0]
6. Collipulli-Temuco [1998, 25] [4, 1]
7. Temuco-Río Bueno [1997, 25] [3, 1]
8. Río Bueno- Puerto Montt [1997, 25] [2, 2]

22. Vespucio-El Salto-Kennedy [2004, 30] [1, 0]
23. Américo Vespucio Nor Poniente [2002, 30] [2, 0]
24. Américo Vespucio Sur [2001, 38] [ 2, 0]
25. Sistema Norte-Sur [2000, 30] [ 4, 0]
26. Sistema Oriente-Poniente [2000, 30] [5, 0]

37. Grupo 1 (Iquique-La Serena-Rancagua) [2002, 23] [0,2]
38. Grupo 2 (Concepción-Antofagasta)2 [2002, 22] [0, 1]
39. Grupo 3 (Santiago1-Valdivia- Puerto Montt) [2004, 23] [1, 1]
Water reservoirss

Other concessions

40. Convento Viejo [2005, 25] [2, 0]
41. El Bato de Illapel2 [2001, 30] [0, 3]

Interurban highways

Airports

Urban public transportation

9. Acceso Nor Oriente a Santiago [2003, 40] [0, 0]
10. Acceso Norte a Concepción [1995, 28] [0, 3]
11. Acceso aeropuerto AMB, Santiago [1996, 12] [1, 2]
12. Autopista Santiago-San Antonio [1995, 23] [4, 4]
13. Camino de la Madera [1994, 25] [1, 1]
14. Camino internacional Ruta 60 Ch. [2002, 32] [2, 1]
15. Santiago-Colina-Los Andes [1996, 28] [3, 2]
16. Nogales –Puchuncaví [1995, 22] [1, 2]
17. Santiago-Valparaíso-Viña [1998, 25] [6, 3]
18. Red vial Litoral Central [2000, 30] [1, 2]
19. Ruta interportuaria Talcahuano-Penco [2002, 42] [2, 1]
20. Túnel El Melón [1993, 23] [0, 3]
21. Variante Melipilla [2001, 30] [1, 1]

27. Arturo Merino Benítez, (Santiago) [1997, 15] [2, 9]
28. Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (Punta Arenas) [2000, 9] [1, 0]
29. Carriel Sur (Concepción) [1999, 16] [ 0, 1]
30. Cerro Moreno ( Antofagasta) [1999, 10] [1, 1]
31. Chacalluta (Arica) [2004, 15] [1, 0]
32. Diego Aracena ( Iquique) [1995, 12] [1, 0]
33. El Loa (Calama) [1997, 12] [1, 0]
34. El Tepual (Puerto Montt) [1995, 12] [2, 0]
35. La Florida (La Serena) [1998, 10] [0, 1]
36. Regional (Copiapó) [2002, 20] [0, 0]

42. Conexión vial Suiza-Las Rejas [2005, 5] [1, 0]
43. Corredor Av. Santa Rosa [2006, 14] [0, 0]
44. Estación de intercambio La Cisterna [2004, 22] [0, 1]
45. Estación de intercambio Quinta Normal2 [2004, 24] [1, 1]
46. Estaciones de trasbordo [2006, 15] [0, 0]
Others
47. Centro de Justicia de Santiago [2004, 23] [0, 0]
48. Estadio techado Parque O´Higgins [2004, 20] [1, 0]
49. Plaza de la Ciudadanía [2004, 30] [1, 0]
50. Landport (Los Andes) [2004, 20] [0, 0]

Notes: (1) In brackets: [year of the original concession contract, term (years)] [number of bilateral renegotiations, number of conciliations and arbitrations ]. (2) The project was cancelled.
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Table 2
Investment and renegotiations in Chilean PPPs
(in $ millions)

(1)
Number
of projects &
renegotiations1

(2)
Average
term
(years)

(3)
Original
investment
estimate3

(4)
Renegotiated
amounts4

(5)
Total
investment

(6)
Share
of total

Pan American Highway
Interurban
Urban

8/28/242
13/22/25
5/12/0

23.8
26.9
31.6

2,875.43
2,118.06
2,420.86

843.46
425.63
1,331.56

3,718.89
2,543.68
3,752.42

0.33
0.23
0.33

Highways

26/62/49

26.9

7,414.35

2,600.64

10,014.99

0.89

Airports
Jails
Water reservoirs
Public transport
Others

10/9/12
3/1/4
2/2/3
5/2/2
4/2/0

13.2
22.5
27.5
14.7
23.2

383.94
221.40
120.00
156.81
168.72

48.08
113.41
24.45
25.82
0.97

432.02
334.82
144.45
182.64
169.69

0.04
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.02

Other concessions

24/16/21

17.5

1,050.87

212.73

1,263.61

0.11

Total or average

50/78/70

22.4

8,465.22

2,813.38

11,278.59

1

Notes: (1) Includes cancelled projects. (2) Projects/bilateral renegotiations/arbitration panel. (3) Excludes cancelled projects. (4) Includes the
amounts which were paid to cancel three concessions.
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Table 3
Renegotiation caps and bilateral renegotiations
(in $ millions)
(1)
Concessions that exceed
the investment limit

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Allowed increase in investment1

Actual increase2

=
(3a)/(2a)

=
(3b)/(2b)

(a)
During
construction

(b)
During the
concession

(a)
During
construction

(b)
During the
concession

(a)
During
construction

(b)
During the
concession

Pan American Highway
Interurban
Urban

4
5
5

3
2
5

80.07
69.90
190.49

158.65
34.81
285.74

396.99
163.36
980.52

396.55
45.33
1,132.41

4.96
2.34
5.15

2.50
1.30
3.96

Highways

14

10

340.47

479.20

1,540.87

1,574.29

4.53

3.29

Airports
Jails
Water reservoirs
Public transport
Others

1
0
1
0
0

1
0
0
0
0

18.40
0.00
8.40
0.00
0.00

3.93
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

20.19
0.00
10.29
0.00
0.00

4.88
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.10
1.23
-

1.24
-

Other concessions

2

1

26.80

3.93

30.48

4.88

1.1

1.24

Total

16

11

367.27

483.13

1,571.35

1,579.18

4.3

3.3

Notes: (1) We only count those concessions that surpassed investment caps. (2) Includes only those amounts added in bilateral renegotiations which add investments not included
in the original contract.

27

Figure 1
Timing of the infrastructure process

t=1

t=1

Congress sets spending cap I 1 .
Firms bid B for building I 1 ≤ I 1 .
Contract {B; I 1 } signed

Congress sets spending cap I 1 .

Incumbent procures I 1 ≤ I 1 ;
construction company builds.

Contract is renegotiated;
additional payment R is agreed,
against building ε ; contract
{B + R; I 1 + ε } signed.

Government collects taxes T1 .

Government collects taxes T1 .

Incumbent issues D = I 1 − T1 and
pays I 1 to the
construction company.

Government issues D = P1 − T1
and pays P1 ≤ I 1 to the
concessionaire.
Election.

Election.

t=2

Government procures 1 − I 1 ;
construction company builds.

t=2

Government procures 1 − ( B + R) ;
construction company builds.

Government collects taxes T2 .

Government collects taxes T2 .

Government collects taxes, pays
1 − I 1 to the construction
company and repays debt D.

Government pays 1 − ( B + R) to
the construction company,
( B + R) − P1 to the concessionaire
and repays debt D.

(a) Conventional provision

(b) PPP provision

Figure 2
Increases in investment as a percentage of the original estimate
60%
55%
51%
50%

40%
35%
30%

33%

29%

20%

20%
20%

20%
16%

13%
10%
1%
0%
Total

Other

Others

Public transport

Water reservoirs

Jails

Airports

Highways

Urban

Interurban

Panamerican

Figure 3
How and what is renegotiated

Arbitration (70)
$ 490 million
(17%)

Renegotiations (148)
$ 2.8 billion
(100%)
Additional investment
$ 2.0 billion
(84%)
Bilateral (78/66)
$ 2.3 billion
(83%)
Additional payments
$ 360 million
(16%)

Figure 4
When are PPPs renegotiated?

During construction (31)
$ 225 million
(46%)
Arbitration (70)
$ 490 million
(17%)
After construction (39)
$ 265 million
(54%)
Renegotiations
$ 2.8 billion
(100%)
During construction (51)
$ 1.8 billion
(78%)
Bilateral (78)
$ 2.3 billion
(83%)
After construction (27)
$ 500 million
(22%)

Figure 5
Who pays when PPPs are renegotiated?

Current administration
$ 299 million
(61%)
Arbitration
$ 490 million
(17%)
Future administrations and users
$ 191 million
(39%)
Renegotiations
$ 2.8 billion
(100%)
Current administration
$ 812 million
(35%)
Bilateral
$ 2.3 billion
(83%)
Future administrations or users
$ 1.5 billion
(65%)

